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Appellees hereby respond to Appellants' Petition for
Rehearing in the above-captioned matter.

This Court's

decision/ filed May 17, 1991, correctly affirms the trial
court's determination that Appellees' deficiency action was
timely commenced.

As Appellants' Petition for Rehearing

presents no new facts, legal authority, or other judicial
analysis to merit review of this court's decision, the Petition
for Rehearing should be denied.
Essentially, Appellant's forward a single argument
under several captions.

That argument is tlhat the Court did

not consider its earlier attempt at persuas:ion.

Appellant

apparently assumes that since the Court did not find in its
favor, the Court must not have realized th^ consequences of its
action or reviewed the authority cited.

Tl^is conclusion is

erroneous, as the Court's decision rests u^on proper statutory
i

interpretation and principles set forth in its prior decisions.
ARGUMENT
STANDARD FEDERAL'S
DEFICIENCY
ACTION
WAS PROPERLY
FILED
A.

Filing is Sufficient to "Commence"
An Action

Section 57-1-32, Utah Code Ann, prpvides that
At any time within three months after any sale of
property under a trust deed, as he reinabove
provided, an action may be commended to recover the
balance due upon the obligation fo r which the trust
deed was given as security. . . . (emphasis
supplied).
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In order to clarify the action required to initiate an action
under this section, Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states that "[a] civil action is commenced (1) by filing a
complaint with the court".

The Rule further provides that "[t]he

court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing the
complaint."

There is no dispute that a complaint was filed in

the proper court within the time limits established by Section
57-1-32.
The Court correctly noted that the "more sensible view
of the operation of the three-month limitation period contained
in section 57-1-32 is that its primary purpose is satisfied when
the foreclosing party provides notice to the debtor that a
deficiency will be sought by filing the action."

Standard

Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 26,
28 (Utah 1991).

This is consistent with this Court's prior

decisions which have consistently determined that an action is
timely commenced where the complaint was filed within the period
of limitations, even though the summons was not served until
after such period.

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d (Utah 1988),

West Mt. Lime & Stone Co. v. Danley, 38 Utah 218, 111 P. 647
(1910), Keyser v. Pollock, 20 Utah 371, 59 P. 87 (1899).
Kirkbride and Soule seek to establish an expanded, more
onerous definition of "commencement".

According to them, "[t]he

filing of a complaint is an ex parte act that does not give
notice to anybody.

Only the service of a summons provides the
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proper notice." (Appellants' Brief, p. 3 ) . There is no authority
cited for this novel proposition, and it id contrary to the plain
language of Rule 3 and this Court's prior holdings.
This argument was considered by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in a recent decision.

In Ross v. Hayes, 62 Okla.B.J. 2428

C 9 Q 1 ) , the Oklahoma court was presented wi th the issue "whether
an action dismissed without prejudice, in w[hich defendants have
not been served with summons, may be filed within one year of the
dismissal pursuant to the savings clause of 12. O.S. 1891
§ 100."

As in Utah, Oklahoma's savings sta tute applies to "any

action" commenced within due time, and prov ides for a one year
period in which actions dimissed without pr|ejudice may be
refiled.

The court, in reaching its decisi on, ruled:
The savings clause of 12 O.S. 198lj § 100 is applicable
to lawsuits timely filed and later dismissed on
grounds unrelated to the merits of the controversy.
Because of its remedial nature, § 100's provisions are
to be liberally construed. The ca rdinal rule of
statutory construction is a determjination of the
legislative intent. However, wher e the Legislature
has plainly expressed itself, ther |e is no need for
judicial interpretation. The language of § 100 in
unambiguous in stating the actions to which it
applies--"any action commenced wit hin due time."
Because an action is "commenced" pursuant to § 2003 by
filing a petition in the trial cou rt, service need no
be obtained in an original action in order to avail a
party of the savings provision of § 100.
The Oklahoma court concluded:
We recognize that the purpose of a statute of
limitations is to ensure that a party has notice of a
claim against him/her within a sta tutory period of
time and an adequate opportunity to prepare his/her
case. However, § 100 was enacted fco avoid the harsh
results flowing from the general r ule that where an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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action fails and the statute of limitations has
expired during the interim, any subsequent action is
untimely.
62 Okla. B.J. 2429-2430.
The same analysis is applicable in this action.

The

Utah savings statute allows no room for ambiguity, it provides
that its protections are afforded to "any action" which falls
within its parameters.

The Jesuitical lengths to which

Appellants have gone to prove their case demonstrates the
poverty of their argument.
The Appellants argue further that they were injured by
Standard Federal's lack of diligence in reinstating its
action.

There is no requirement within Section 78-12-40, the

Utah savings statute, that an action be filed at any given
point within the one-year period provided.

Kirkbride and Soule

apparently have not minded remaining in a "state of financial
uncertainty" during the pendency of this litigation.

The

Appellants' argument in this regard lacks any analysis as to
precisely what constitutes a "reasonable period" within which
an action should be filed under the savings statute.
B.

The Utah Savings Statute Applies
To Deficiency Actions

The Court correctly observed that there is a paucity
of case law regarding the application of a savings statute to a
statute establishing a right to a deficiency action.

Further,

there is no legislative history appended to either statute
which could be used to guide the Court.

In the absence
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of these lodestars, the Court's reasoning peaches a fair and
just result.
Kirkbride and Soule repeat two arguments in support of
their position.

First, they threaten that,| if the Court's

decision is not reversed, the Court will unwittingly adopt a
'minority view".

In support of this conten tion, they cite to

an American Jurisprudence paragraph and supporting citations.
There are, however, no modern cases which s upport Appellant's
position, and no citation to any case involjving a trust deed
deficiency statute.
The primary argument relied upon bly Kirkbride and
Soule is that the Utah savings statute appl ies only to those
causes of action identified in Section 78-1 2-1, e_t seq.
Relying upon the same American Jurisprudencle paragraph,
Appellants assert that the deficiency statu|te creates a right
of action not found at common law, and thus is not subject to
the general application of the savings stat hte.

The Court

correctly rejected this artificial standard
The Court's decision to examine th e practical
application of the savings statute to a def iciency period is
sound jurisprudence.

As the Court stated, ^:he deficiency

statute does not, by its terms, contain a 1 imitation upon
rights conferred by the statute.

Instead, the commencement

requirement is a procedural hurdle to the s ait rather than an
absolute bar.
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Further, Kirkbride and Soule's attempted distinction
between "statutory" and common law actions lacks clarity and is
unfounded.

According to their construction, the limitation

periods set forth in Title 78 of the Utah Code Ann, are
independent of all other statutes.

Thus, tolling periods for

infancy or other disability (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36), for
absence from the state (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-38), or for
death (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-37), would have no applicability
to any cause of action codified outside Title 78.
This has not been the finding of this Court.

In

Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082, (1981), the court determined
that infancy tolled the limitations period contained in the
Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l, et
seg.

Similarly, infancy tolls the statutory period identified

in Utah's Wrongful Death statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7.
Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 245 (1980).

Utah is firmly

in the camp of states which recognize that, unless otherwise
clearly stated within the statute, periods of limitation affect
the remedy and not the right of action.

Kirkbride, 161 Utah

Adv. Rep. at p. 27.
Finally, Kirkbride and Soule can articulate no
rational basis for the distinction they urge the court to
adopt.

In one sense, a deficiency action is merely a

codification of the right to collect a debt, one of the writs
recognized from the dawn of common law.

The legislature has
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undertaken to circumscribe that ability to (collect a debt, but,
as the Court recognizes, has not legislated the right out of
existence.
C.

The Court's Decision is Consistent
With Its Prior Rulings

The Appellants seek to identify th is case as a radical
departure from prior Utah jurisprudence.

They suggest that the

Court was unaware of many of these cases, o r, inexplicably,
ignored them in making its decision.

This is inaccurate.

Kirkbride and Soule present no newj theory or case law
which supports their contention.

Instead, their Petition for

Rehearing repeats the same argument that wa s presented in their
initial Brief.

The Court has considered it^ prior decisions

and its present ruling is consistent with tpose rulings.
For example, Kirkbride and Soule atgue that the
Court's decision in AAA Fencing Co. v. Rain|:ree Development and
i

Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 (1986) is an example of where the
Court has recognized the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute to be
contain a limitation upon a right, rather than a limitation of
a remedy.

The conclusion to be drawn from this, is that the

deficiency statute is to be similarly construed.

Appellants

ignore the fundamental distinguishing featute of AAA, however;
that being that no action was commenced und^r the statute at
issue in AAA.

Had an action been commenced|under the Utah

Mechanic's Lien Statute, the Court could ha^e then addressed
that particular issue.

In this case, as distinguished from
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AAA, there is no question that an action was commenced in a
timely fashion pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-32.
Similarly, Kirkbride and Soule cite Projects
Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738
(Utah 1990) as authority for their contention that the
commencement restriction in that statute is exempt from the
tolling and renewal statutes.

In that case, however, the Court

recognized that other provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, including the relation back of amendments, do apply
to the mechanic's lien laws.

The court gave special

consideration to the fact that an action had been commenced
under the mechanic's lien statute, noting "[c]commencing the
action preserves the lien."

As in the instant case, the

primary requirement of the statute is that an action be
commenced, a restriction satisfied in this action.
CONCLUSION
Appellants' Petition for Rehearing fails to enunciate
any reason for the Court to revisit its decision in this
action.

The Petition merely restates already-argued points of

law and case law, and fails to forward any legal theory which
would justify reversal.

The Petition for Rehearing should be

denied.
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